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INTRODUCTION: INEQUALITY: A COMPELLING TIME TO
ADOPT LATIN AMERICAN PRINCIPLES

COVID-19 has disproportionately affected the health and finances of
America's most vulnerable workers who labored in hospitals, grocery stores,
meat factories, and public transportation systems throughout the deadliest
months of the virus.1 Disproportionately Black and Latinx, "essential"
workers and their families have borne the brunt of COVID-19's adverse
health effects.2
While COVID-19 has worsened the situation of vulnerable workers and
their families, race- and class-based inequalities have simmered beneath the
surface for a long time. 3 U.S. blue-collar workers have lost significant ground
for decades relative to their upper-middle-class counterparts, fueling
unsettling political divisions. 4 Moreover, predictions abound that post-

1 The Plight ofEssential Workers Duringthe COVID-19 Pandemic, THE LANCET (May 23, 2020),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7241973/.
2 Id. Moreover, during the pandemic's rage in the U.S., there was an uprising of persons of all
races and classes in response to police abuse of citizens of color, in particular the deaths of Breonna Taylor
and George Floyd at the hands of the police. See Protests Erupt in US After the Deaths of George Floyd
and Breonna Taylor-in Pictures, THE GUARDIAN (May 30, 2020), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/gallery/2020/may/29/george-floyd-breonna-taylor-protests-photos.
3 Delphine Strauss, Male Blue-Collar Workers 'Twice as Likely to Die from COVID-19,' FIN.
TIMES (May 11, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/fb8f902-c36b-4ae6-85ad-ladc5ea197bb.
4

See Ann C. McGinley & David McClure, We Are All Contingent:Fighting Vulnerability in the

US Workforce, in VULNERABILITY AND THE LEGAL ORGANIZATION OF WORK 259 (Martha Albertson

Fineman & Jonathan W. Fineman eds., 2018).
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COVID-19 the gap between blue-collar and white-collar workers' incomes
and wealth will be even wider.'
Although law alone cannot remedy economic inequalities in the U.S.
that have resulted from years of decline in the quality of American jobs,6
labor and employment law should play an important role in protecting
vulnerable workers from abuse and, simultaneously, allow a flourishing U.S.
economy to benefit all members of society. Such protection would require a
rebalancing of the rights accorded to employees vis a vis those enjoyed by
employers as a matter of right.
In PrincipledLabor Law: U.S. Labor Law Through a Latin American

Method,' published before the outbreak of the pandemic, authors Sergio
Gamonal Contreras & Cesar F. Rosado Marzin argue that U.S. courts should
follow the Latin American method of applying long-held jurisprudential
principles to interpret labor and employment law. The authors' baseline is
clear: applying these principles to U.S. employment law will better the
employment opportunities and stability of workers who suffer from unequal
bargaining power and the ever-present employer-oriented employment-atwill doctrine.9

5 Bharat Ramamurti, The Shift Toward Remote Work Could Leave Blue-Collar Workers Behind,
CNN (last updated Sept. 16, 2020), https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/16/perspectives/remote-work-bluecollar/index.html (predicting that after the pandemic a larger percentage of white collar workers will
continue to work at least part of the time from home while blue-collar workers, who are disproportionately
of color and female, will continue to work at the worksite; this change will increase disparities in both
incomes and wealth); see also Warren Slams $5.2 Million Bonus After Nursing-Home COVID Deaths,
BLOOMBERG
L.
(Jan.
28,
2021,
12:01
PM),
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/exp/eyJjdHhOIjoiQlZOVylslmlkIjoiMDAwMDAxNzetNDlhMilkYzk
xLWFmZjctNjlhNzJhNTgwMDAxliwic2lnljoiaHdTSTV6dVJzSGt3THUydlUremNpbG9xSjJJPSIsInR
pbWUiOilxNjExODY4MzE4IiwidXVpZCI6ImYwV1h3bmFZbXBFNHdrT3czZ25nMVE9PXlzeGM
T0tibC8zVzV3c0c5WGtwc3c9PSIsInYiOiIxIn0=?usertype=External&bwid=00000177-49a2-dc91-aff769a72a580001&qid=7049989&cti=LSCH&uc=1320028205&et=NEWSLETTER&eme=bvnw_nl%3A
3&source=newsletter&item=body-link&region=text-section (explaining that Senator Elizabeth Warren
was furious when she found out that Cares Act funding was used by Genesis, a company that runs nursing
homes, in part to pay a $5.2 million bonus to its CEO who resigned within two months of the payment).
The differential between what nursing aides and assistants and the CEO of the health care company earn
is significant and increased, it appears, because of COVID-19.
6

See McGinley & McClure, supra note 4, at 259-60.

7

When I use the terms "labor law" and "employment law," I refer, as North American legal
scholars normally do, to "labor law" as the law that governs unionization, concerted action, and collective
bargaining. "Employment law" refers to the broader group of laws and doctrines that apply to the
employment relationship.
8

SERGIO GAMONAL CONTRERAS & CESAR F. ROSADO MARZAN, PRINCIPLED LABOR LAW: U.S.

LABOR LAW THROUGH A LATIN AMERICAN METHOD (2019).

9 The employment-at-will doctrine is a judicial doctrine prevalent in U.S. law. It holds that absent
a contractual limitation or a public policy or statutory exception, it is permissible to fire employees for a
good reason, no reason, or even a bad reason (that is not made illegal such as illegal discrimination). Only
Montana, Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have abrogated the doctrine through enactment of statutes.
See MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901-15 (1987); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29 §§ 185a-m (2010); U.S. Virgin
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This is not a radical book; it merely recognizes reality-the unequal
positions of individual non-unionized employees and their employers-and
offers a partial solution that would improve the plight of vulnerable workers.
The authors explain that European law has already accepted many of the
ideas supporting these principles but that U.S. employment law has lagged
behind in recognizing employee vulnerability and protecting employee
rights. Thus, they argue, applying Latin American principles to U.S. law, if
successful, would demonstrate that even the most labor-unfriendly countries
(e.g., the U.S.) can benefit their employees simply by adopting these
jurisprudential principles.10
Labor law principles, as defined by the authors, are "guidelines that
inform some norms and directly or indirectly inspire a series of solutions [to
cases], so that they promote and channel the adoption of new norms, guide
the interpretation of existing ones, and resolve unforeseen cases and
controversies.""1 In essence, these principles operate as a set of interpretive
tools similar to the canons of construction for statutory interpretation in
American jurisprudence, except that they apply to the interpretation of
contractual relationships as well as to statutes, and also relate specifically to
labor and employment relations and law.12 The authors emphasize that
although these principles are admittedly pro-employee, application of the
principles does not guarantee that the employee wins a dispute with the
employer. Rather, the "principles exist only to aid the adjudicator when he or
she confronts an interpretation quandary" with respect to employee status,
right to certain wages, waiver of rights to a class action, etc. 13
While PrincipledLabor Law was published before the outbreak of the
global pandemic, and its topic was important and timely when it came out in
2019, it is even more crucial today to consider the proposed reforms offered
by the book's authors because the pandemic has not only revealed deep

Islands Wrongful Discharge Act, 24 V.I. Code Ann. tit. 24, § 76. For an analysis of the difference between
the Puerto Rican law and that of Montana, see Jorge M. Farinacci-F6mos, The Search for a Wrongful
Dismissal Statute: A Look at Puerto Rico's Act No. 80 as a Potential Starting Point, 17 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL'Y J. 125 (2013) (describing the Puerto Rican law, which includes not only just cause protections but
also presumptions that are protective of employees).
10 GAMONAL & ROSADO, supra note 8, at 5-6.
11

Id. at 9, quoting AMERICO PLA RODRIGUEZ, Los PRINCIPIOS DEL DERECHO DEL TRABAJO 14

(3d. ed. 1998).
12 GAMONAL & ROSADO, supra note 8, at 9; Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of
Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L.
REV. 395, 401-06 (1950) (explaining that each canon of construction has a counter that would point in
the opposite direction). The canons of construction have experienced something of a revival since the late
20th Century. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Canons of Statutory Construction
and Judicial Preferences, 45 VAND. L. REV. 647 (1992) (arguing that Karl Llewellyn's "interesting"
critique unfortunately led to the derailment of discussion of the canons of construction).
13

GAMONAL & ROSADO, supra note 8, at 17.
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fissures in our system of pre-existing inequalities, both financial and racial,
but it has also exacerbated those inequalities.
Gamonal and Rosado focus on the Thirteenth Amendment, 14 the
National Labor Relations Act,1 5 and the Fair Labor Standards Act16 to
demonstrate that the Latin American principles they advocate already have a
sound basis in U.S. law, but they also argue that these principles should go
further in their application to U.S. labor and employment law. Some of the
principles they support underlie the passage of the Thirteenth Amendment's
ban on slavery and involuntary servitude and the enactment of 20th Century
labor-related statutory provisions. However, the continuity of employment
principle, which protects employees from discharge absent employer proof
of just cause, directly contradicts U.S. common law.
This article discusses the book's arguments with reference to
interpretation of U.S. statutory and common law and goes a step further. It
imagines how consciously applying the principles described by Gamonal and
Rosado to U.S. anti-discrimination law could provide further protection to
U.S. employees covered by civil rights law. This analysis focuses on Title
VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,1 7 but also refers to other civil rights laws
such as Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act,18 and the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act. 19 These laws openly create exceptions to
the common law employment-at-will doctrine, and therefore, there is a strong
argument that in addition to the National Labor Relations Act, which permits
unionization and collective bargaining agreements that require an employer
to prove "just cause" to discharge an employee, American anti-discrimination
law would appropriately benefit from the principles identified in Gamonal
and Rosado's book.
Nonetheless, even though U.S. anti-discrimination law is apparently
grounded in all of the principles Gamonal and Rosado identify, the intrusion
of the employment-at-will doctrine, combined with the concept of
employers' freedom to protect their businesses and an overblown sense of a

14 The Thirteenth Amendment bans slavery and involuntary servitude and has been interpreted by
labor scholars as a potential source of rights for paid labor relationships. See, e.g., Rebecca E. Zietlow,
The Maryland Constitutional Law Schmooze: Conclusion: The Political Thirteenth Amendment, 71 MD.
L. REV. 283, 290 (2011) (arguing that Congress has the power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment
through Article 2 to protect the rights of workers and racial minorities but has refused to do so); Lea S.
Vandervelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 437, 438-40 (1989)
(arguing that the Thirteenth Amendment went well beyond abolishing slavery; the debates over the
amendment demonstrate that ratifiers envisioned a much broader interpretation of free labor).
15

29 U.S.C.

16

29 U.S.C.

17

42 U.S.C.

18

42 U.S.C.

§§ 151-169 (1947).
§ 203 (2018).
§ 2000e-1, etseq. (1991).
§ 12101, et seq. (2008).

19

29 U.S.C.

§§

621-634 (2008).

[Vol. 16:741
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publicly-owned entity's responsibility to maximize profits for its
stockholders, has done serious harm to the courts' interpretations of the antidiscrimination statutes. 20
Part II analyzes the recommendations of Gamonal and Rosado for
applying the Latin American principles to U.S. labor and employment law.
Part III builds upon Gamonal and Rosado's theory, using the Latin American
principles they identify to interpret U.S. employment discrimination law. It
demonstrates that these principles, as a theoretical matter, should apply to
U.S. employment discrimination law to protect employees further from
illegal discrimination. It also identifies structural and political problems
related to the adoption of the Latin American principles to U.S. jurisprudence
and offers solutions to the barriers created by these problems.
Finally, the article concludes that U.S. labor and employment law
should protect workers from potential abuse caused by power differentials
between workers and employers, and that, adapted to U.S. law, especially to
statutes whose purpose is to protect workers' rights, Latin American
principles could effectively give judges interpretive tools that would make
application of the law more consistent with and protective of individual
rights. Even if federal courts and Congress do not act to protect employees'
rights, many state legislatures and courts should adopt these principles.
II.

LATIN AMERICAN PRINCIPLES EXPLAINED

Gamonal and Rosado explain that many Latin American countries have
established principles whose purpose is to protect workers from abuse and to
govern interpretation of labor and employment laws. They specifically focus
on Argentina and Brazil, two of the largest countries in the area, and Chile
and Uruguay, much smaller countries but among the better performing
economies of the region.2 1 The well-established principles the authors
identify are: (1) The protective principle; 22 (2) The primacy of reality
principle;23 (3)

The non-waiver principle;24

and (4)

The continuity

2

principle. ' As the authors note, these principles are interrelated; they work

20
See Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent
NationalDischarge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1447 (1996) (arguing for a federal law that would
eliminate the employment-at-will doctrine).

21

GAMONAL & ROSADO, supra note 8, at 27.

22

Id. at ch. 2, 31-62.

23

Id. at ch. 3, 63-92.

24

Id. at ch. 4, 93-118.

25

Id. at ch. 5, 119-44.
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together and reinforce one another: "protection logically requires primacy of
reality, nonwaiver, and continuity." 26
A.

The Protective Principle

Gamonal and Rosado quote Uruguayan legal scholar Oscar Ermida who
stated that the raison d'etre of labor law is to protect the worker.2 7 They
explain that employers who have absolute power to set the terms and
conditions of employment can subordinate employees, depriving them of
autonomy and dignity and making them "close to involuntary servants." 2 8
Thus, Gamonal and Rosado argue, the law needs to rebalance the asymmetry
of power to safeguard the employees' human dignity and society's moral
interests. 29
The protective principle assumes that the purpose of labor law is to
equalize the power differential between employee and employer. This
principle emerges from the documents of the International Labor
Organization (ILO) and other international human rights agreements that
were negotiated internationally post-World Wars I and II.30 The universal
protective principle has led to the legal rule in Latin America in dubio pro
operario,31 which means that when the meaning of the law is ambiguous, the
judge should interpret the law in favor of the worker. As Gamonal and
Rosado explain, this legal rule does not mean that the employee always wins.
Nor is it ordinarily used as the decisive criterion in determining how to apply
the law, but it serves as a supporting argument that calls for labor courts and
other adjudicators to take a labor-protective role. 32
Gamonal and Rosado argue that the concepts underlying the protective
principle are not limited to European and Latin American Labor Law. Rather,
they note, both the Thirteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and New
Deal laws-particularly the National Labor Relations Act33 and the Fair
Labor Standards Act 34-are grounded in the concept of labor protection.35
The Thirteenth Amendment itself is not limited to abolishing slavery, 36 but

26

Id. at 10.

27

Id. at 31.

28

Id. at 31-32.

29

Id. at 32.

30

Id. at 34.

31

Id. at 33.

32

Id. at 41.

33
34

29 U.S.C.
29 U.S.C.

35

GAMONAL & ROSADO, supra note 8, at 41-52.

36

See Vandervelde, supra note 14, at 438-40.

§§ 151-169 (1947).
§ 203 (2018).
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also protects labor rights beyond elimination of slavery and gives Congress
the power to enforce those rights. 37 And, at least when the NLRA was first
enacted, one of its underlying principles was to protect workers. Gamonal
and Rosado acknowledge that the passage of the Taft Hartley Act of 194738
amended the NLRA to grant more power to employers and limit workers'
rights, but they argue that even after the amendments, the underlying
protective principles of the NLRA remained. Many scholars argue, and
Gamonal and Rosado tend to agree, that the NLRA had tremendous potential
in creating labor rights, and that courts have deradicalized the NRLA in their
interpretation of the Act. 39 Moreover, Gamonal and Rosado argue that the
NLRA "has the potential to be more protective if constitutionalized through
the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution." 40 As to the FLSA, the
authors argue that Congress sought to protect workers by regulating
minimum wage standards and maximum hours, and by creating bars to child
labor. 41 And, they note that for nearly seventy years after the FLSA's passage,
it was interpreted with the remedial purposes of the statute in mind-similar
to the in dubio pro operarioprinciple in Latin America. 42 Unfortunately, the
authors argue, the U.S. Supreme Court recently "almost summarily ended the
doctrine of giving the FLSA a broad reading" in Encino Motorcars, LLC v.
Navarro.43 This case, which contradicts the liberal interpretation of the
remedial statute to protect workers' rights, undermines the protective nature
of the statute, and if the legal rule in dubio pro operariowere in operation, it
would be considered improper.
B.

The Primacy ofReality Principle

The primacy of reality principle posits that when there is a conflict
between an employer and a worker concerning the terms of an employment
relationship, it is the facts on the ground that matter. Facts take precedence
over language in the texts, documents, and agreements. Underlying this
principle is the acknowledgment that employment contracts are not typical

37 GAMONAL & ROSADO, supra note 8, at 42 n.48 (citing Rebecca E. Zietlow, The Ideological
Origins of the Thirteenth Amendment, 49 HOus. L. REV. 393, 448 (2012)).
38

GAMONAL & ROSADO, supra note 8, at 52-53.

39 See, e.g., Karl E. Klare, JudicialDeradicalizationofthe Wagner Act andthe Origins of Modern
Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 265 (1978) (arguing that when enacted the
Wagner Act was a radical statute but subsequent judicial interpretation deradicalized the statute).
40 GAMONAL & ROSADO, supra note 8, at 56.
41

Id. at 57-58.

42

Id. at 59.

43

Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 138 S. Ct. 1134, 1143 (2018) (noting that the statute did
not explicitly call for a broad reading of the law and stating that the law deserved a "fair" reading, rather
than a "liberal" reading).
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contracts. Instead, they create relationships, and the contract terms are in
"constant flux and negotiation by the parties thorough principal requests or
demands and agent performances." 44 Thus, adjudicators determining the
terms of the contract between an employer and a worker must consider the
parties' post-formation conduct and should grant preference to parties'
conduct during the employment relationship over what they may have agreed
to in writing or verbally. 4 5 Like the protective principle, the primacy of
reality principle relies on the in dubio pro operariopreference which, in this
context, means that terms in the agreement that are favorable to the worker
will be given weight if there is doubt about the meaning of the agreement.
This principle is often invoked when there is a debate as to whether the
worker is an employee or an independent contractor. 46 In essence, this
principle rejects formalist definitions and interpretations of the parties'
relationship. Instead, reality and facts matter and should take precedence
when interpreting the law. Combined with the protective and the continuity
principles, this principle favors employment over independent contractor
relationships and presumes that the relationships are for an indefinite period
of time unless proven otherwise.
Gamonal and Rosado explain that U.S. law often recognizes the primacy
of reality over formality as well. For example, an employer may not
incorrectly identify an employee as an independent contractor in a written
contract in order to avoid the obligations employers have to employees. 4 7 The
authors go through a complicated explanation of the FLSA, NLRA, and U.S.
common law definitions of "employee" versus "independent contractor,"
demonstrating that a mere label of "employee" or "independent contractor"
does not govern relationships in the U.S. However, they note that even the
most worker-friendly definition may be interpreted variously depending on
the underlying politics of the adjudicators (e.g., executive agencies) who
must determine whether an individual is an employee or an independent
contractor. This means that as the President's party changes, the
determination by executive agencies may also change. If, however, the
primacy of reality principle were joined with the protective principle, the
agencies would likely reach more consistent, worker-protective results. 4 8
44

GAMONAL & ROSADO, supra note 8, at 66.

45

Id. at 67 n.18.

46

Id. at 68.
Id. at 67-68.

47

48 In fact, in addition to the definitions of "employee" under different federal laws, state laws may
have even different definitions. For example, the California Supreme Court has created the "ABC" rule,
which presumes that a worker is an employee. A worker is not an independent contractor under California
law unless the employer proves that the worker is free of employer control, engaged in a separate line of
work, and has his own business. Dynamex Operations W. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018). The
California legislature enacted this decision into statute. In 2021, the California Supreme Court held that
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The Non-Waiver Principle

The non-waiverprinciple makes rights granted to workers by the law
non-waivable by contract with an employer. The law establishes a "floor of
rights that workers cannot waive." 4 9 This principle derives from the
inequality of bargaining power of employers and workers and the public need
to enforce protective labor legislation. If an individual worker were able to
waive his or her legal rights, employers would pressure applicants and
workers to do so, using their superior bargaining power. Clearly, as in Latin
America, where there is protective legislation in the U.S., the employer may
not require an employee to waive the protection, but as Gamonal and Rosado
explain, there is a glaring problem in the U.S. The Supreme Court interprets
the Federal Arbitration Act5 0 to permit employers to enforce pre-dispute
arbitration clauses, which often deprives employees of crucial procedural
rights that affect their substantive employment rights. As the authors explain,
a simple "principle" would not overcome the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the FAA. Nonetheless, the question remains: Had the principle existed at
the time of the first FAA arbitration in employment case, would the Supreme
Court have reconsidered its broad interpretation of the FAA as it constricted
employee rights? In essence, a principle whose purpose is to rebalance the
inequalities of bargaining power would most likely not permit the
enforcement of arbitration clauses negotiated with employers or, more
commonly, imposed by the employer before the dispute arises with an
employee.
Countless legal academics in the U.S. have criticized the Court's
interpretation of the FAA as applying to these contracts and have
demonstrated that rights of employees are distinctly disadvantaged by
application of these contracts.5 1 While the Court distinguishes between
this test will be applied retroactively. But in 2020, voters in California had overturned this rule with
reference to ride-hailing and delivery workers, preserving their independent contractor status and setting
up a wage schedule for them. See Jon Steingart, Calif High CourtSays Dynamex ABC Test Is Retroactive,
LAw360 (Jan. 14, 2021, 6:51 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1345191/calif-high-court-saysdynamex-abc-test-is-retroactive; Vazquez v. Jan-Pro Franchising Int'l, Inc., 478 P.3d 1207 (Cal. 2021).
49

GAMONAL & ROSADO, supra note 8, at 95.

50

9 U.S.C.

51

§ 1.

See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment ContractExclusion in Section 1
of the FederalArbitrationAct: Correcting the Judiciary's Failure of Statutory Vision, 1991 J. DISP.
RESOL. 259 (1991) (arguing that Section 1 of the FAA should be interpreted broadly to protect all
employees); Jean R. Sternlight, Is the U.S. Out on a Limb? Comparing the U.S. Approach to Mandatory
Consumer and Employment Arbitration to That of the Rest of the World, 56 U. MIA. L. REV. 831, 832
(2002) (explaining that the U.S. stands alone in enforcing pre-dispute mandatory arbitration in the
employment context and arguing that such practices should be banned); Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming
Employees: How American Employers Are Using Mandatory Arbitration to Deprive Workers of Legal
Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1310-14 (2015) (demonstrating that mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration clauses are depriving workers of substantive rights); Mark D. Gough, The High Costs of an
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waivers of substantive rights and waivers of procedural safeguards provided
by a federal court forum, these academics have convincingly demonstrated
that mandatory enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration clauses does harm and
even deprives employees' of their substantive civil rights.52 Thus, a clear nonwaiver in U.S. law, applied to pre-dispute arbitration provisions should be
enacted into law to protect employees.
D. The Continuity Principle

The continuity principle, which is also referred to as employment
"stability" or "permanence," means that jurists in Latin America presume that
employment contracts have an indefinite duration. 53 The authors explain that
this principle, which is at odds with the U.S. employment-at-will doctrine,
means three things in Latin American jurisprudence: (A) The employer has
the burden to prove that it had just cause to discharge an employee; (B)
Despite changes to contractual terms or to the parties to a contract (e.g.,
successor corporations acquiring the business), judges have the power to
subsequently bind employers to the contract terms; and (C) Judges have the
power to reform precarious contracts, under certain conditions, to form more
stable, permanent contracts.54 These reformations, however, are not to
produce equity between the parties but rather to assure that the contract is
legally sound.
Of the principles identified by Gamonal and Rosado, continuity is the
least embedded in U.S. law. As Gamonal and Rosado point out, the
employment-at-will doctrine is not labor law.55 It emerges from masterservant law, not from the concept of worker protection that is at the core of
labor law. 56 The employment-at-will doctrine, which permits employers to
fire employees, absent a contract to the contrary, for a good reason, a bad
reason, or no reason at all, governs the employment of most U.S. workers.
Only one state-Montana-and two U.S. territories-Puerto Rico and the

Inexpensive Forum: An EmpiricalAnalysis of Employment DiscriminationClaims Heard in Arbitration
and Civil Litigation, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 112 (2014) (using an empirical analysis and
controlling for type of case, size of employer, procedural mechanisms, etc. the author finds that "outcomes
in arbitrationare starkly inferior to outcomes in litigation"); Alexander J. S. Colvin, An EmpiricalStudy
ofEmployment Arbitration:Case Outcomes andProcesses,8 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 1, 5, 8-9 (2011);
Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Arbitrationand Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical
Comparison, 58 DISP. RESOL. J. 44, 47-51 (2003) (finding disparities between award amounts and win
rates in arbitration and litigation for lower-pay employees).
52

See, e.g., Jean Sternlight, DisarmingEmployees, supra note 51, at 1314.

53

GAMONAL & ROSADO, supra note 8, at 119.

54

Id.

55

Id. at 138.

56

Id.
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Virgin Islands-require an employer to demonstrate just cause before firing
an employee.57 The NLRA permits unionized employees to enter into
collective bargaining agreements, which commonly contain just cause
requirements with labor arbitrators determining in individual cases whether
the employer has proved just cause. But unionization in private industries
represents only 7.1 percent of the working population in the U.S. 58 Public
employees often have just cause protections and represent the bulk of U.S.
workers who are not employed at will, but even in the public section only
37.2 percent of the workers are unionized. 59 The lack of workplace stability
in the U.S., then, differs sharply from that found in the Latin American
countries that Gamonal and Rosado discuss.
Even more, a new corporation's successor liability to abide by the
previous employer's collective bargaining obligations with the union is
limited in U.S. law to the situation where the new employer is a "clear
successor," a test that has varied over the years depending on the executive
in power and the composition of the National Labor Relations Board.
Moreover, in the vast majority of U.S. cases, although judges may conclude
that individuals who are termed "independent contractors" are actually
employees under the labor laws and thus have certain rights reserved for
employees, they do not rewrite contracts between companies and workers
who are true independent contractors. Although the other principles
discussed would help protect workers, without a continuity principle, U.S.
workers are still at a significant disadvantage.
.

TranslatingLatin American Principlesto U.S. Law

One difficulty with Gamonal and Rosado's approach is that the U.S. and
Latin America have different legal histories and systems. While the Latin
American countries are more similar to Continental Europe in that they have
country-wide, code-based legal systems, the U.S., with the exception of the

57 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 915; P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 29,
Islands Wrongful Discharge Act, V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 76.

§§

185a-m (2010); U.S. Virgin

58 In 2019, 7.1% of private sector employees and 37.2% of public sector employees were
represented by a union. In total, employees represented by a union equaled 11.2% of employees in the
combined public and private sectors. Percentages of employees who were members of a union are even
lower. See Heidi Shierholz, The Number of Workers Represented by a Union Held Steady in 2019, While
Union MembershipFell, ECON. POL'Y INST. (Jan. 22, 2020), https://www.epi.org/publication/2019-unionmembershipdata/#:~:text=Union%20coverage%20by%20sector%2C%20demographic,from%207.2%/o25%20to%207.
1%25.
59

Id.
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State of Louisiana, inherited its legal system from English common law.6 0
Moreover, unlike in Latin America where the federal governments have labor
codes that dictate the rights of workers and employers, U.S. labor and
employment law is governed in large part by state common and statutory law
and also by federal statutes that guarantee minimum wages, maximum hours,
collective bargaining rights, and health and safety standards as well as federal
civil rights anti-discrimination statutes.
Some public employees (but not private employees) in the U.S. have
employment rights secured by the U.S. Constitution, whereas in Chile, for
example, employees have rights based in the Chilean constitution not to
suffer certain forms of discrimination even in privately-owned workplaces. 61
This divergence of systems complicates the translation of Latin American
principles to U.S. labor and employment law. This is especially true given
the U.S. employment-at-will doctrine that is the governing norm to which all
the statutory law (federal and state) is only a partial exception.
The question then becomes: What U.S. law should be subject to the
principles articulated by Gamonal and Rosado: common law, state statutes,
federal statutes? All of the above? Moreover, Gamonal and Rosado argue that
the U.S. should "constitutionalize" some of the principles by using the
Thirteenth Amendment. Would doing so require Congress to pass legislation
pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment? If so, what form should this
legislation take?
Furthermore, although Gamonal and Rosado discuss the U.S.
equivalents (and lack thereof) in American labor law to the principles that
apply in Latin America, there are other significant similarities between the
labor law principles in Latin American law and U.S. law generally that the
authors do not discuss. Although these similarities do not appear in U.S. labor
law, they exist, at least in theory, in other areas of U.S. law and suggest that
the labor law principles for judicial interpretation have precedent in U.S. law.
Like courts in Latin America, U.S. courts use interpretive rules,
presumptions, or procedural tools to break ties when in doubt of how a case
should be resolved. Examples include: (1) statutory canons of construction;
(2) construction of ambiguous contract provisions against the drafter; (3) the
rule of lenity, a canon of construction in criminal law that requires courts to
construe any ambiguity in favor of the defendant;6 2 (4) a rule that remedial
statutes, such as civil rights statutes, should be construed liberally in favor of
those protected by the laws; (5) a number of rules of deference to
60 See The Common Law and Civil Law Traditions, BERKELEY L. 1-4 (2017),
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/CommonLawCivilLawTraditions.pdf.
61 Ann C. McGinley, Gender, Law, and Culture in the Legal Workplace: A Chilean Case Study,
60 ARIz. L. REV. 675, 687-89 (2018).
62

See, e.g., Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004).
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administrative agencies; and (6) shifting of burdens of production and
persuasion. These tools may provide appropriate comparisons with the
principles articulated in Latin American labor law and support the concept
that it is not a long stretch to argue that at least some of the Latin American
principles should apply to U.S. labor and employment law.
1.

Statutory Canons of Construction
a.

In Genera63

American courts have a number of tiebreaking rules and maxims that
aid in statutory interpretation. The Canons of Statutory Construction are
perhaps the most important of these tools and the most similar to the
principles that Latin American judges consult when interpreting labor and
employment statutes. One important difference, as we shall see, is that the
Latin American principles derive from an interest in protecting employee
rights, whereas the U.S. canons apply more generally to statutory
interpretation and have as their stated purpose the neutral construction of
statutes. The irony is that while there is debate 64 among U.S. academics about
the value of the canons of construction in statutory interpretation, there is no
question that U.S. courts rely heavily on them. 65 Such heavy use of the canons
of construction among U.S. judges would likely make the judges comfortable
with adopting the judicial principles identified by Gamonal and Rosado.
Legal scholars in the U.S. have launched a number of critiques and
defenses of the canons. Karl Llewellyn was one of the first academics to
criticize the canons, demonstrating that many canons of construction
contradict one another. 66 Other legal realists and critical theorists followed. 67
Some legal academics have defended the canons as providing legal stability
and allowing for the dynamic evolution of statutes. 68 At the very least, one
defender argues, the canons provide a sort of checklist for judges engaging

63

For this section of the article, I am indebted to WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND

MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION AND REGULATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 700-

09 (6th ed. 2014).
64 Id. at 704-08.
65
Statutory Interpretation:Theories, Tools, and Trends, EVERYCRSREPORT.COM (Apr. 5, 2018),
https://www.everyersreport.com/reports/R45153.html#_Toc510711652.
66
See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950) (noting, for example, that
the canon advocating the liberal construction of remedial statutes contradicts the canon that states that
statutes in derogation of common law should not be extended by construction).

67

ESKRIDGE, supra note 63, at 704-06.

68

Id. at 707.
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in statutory interpretation. 69 An interesting empirical study by James Brudney
and Corey Ditslear7 0 found that: (1) the more conservative Rehnquist Court
used the canons more frequently than the Burger Court; (2) both liberals and
conservatives use the cannons to justify ideological results; and (3) since
1988, however, the canons have been used to justify conservative results
much more frequently whereas the dissents in a subset of these cases refer to
legislative history to justify their more liberal arguments. 71 The authors
concluded that although the canons are useful to encourage consistency in
areas where judges have little expertise, their evidence suggests that the
malleability of the canons allow judges to manipulate them to reach results
they desire. 72
Given that the Latin American principles have the clear purpose of
reducing the effects of the power differential between employers and
employees, their use to reach fairer results is less problematic than the
manipulation that some U.S. jurists engage in when using the canons, which
are supposed to be applied neutrally, to interpret statutes. As described by
Gamonal and Rosado, the Latin American principles are used only as
tiebreakers when a statute's meaning is difficult to decipher. 73
b.

The Rule of Lenity

The rule of lenity is a statutory cannon that encourages strict
construction of penal laws. It applies most frequently to criminal statutes, but
it also applies to some civil statutes, such as civil forfeiture, that punish the
defendant. The rationales for the rule of lenity are to provide fair notice to
the defendant who may lose liberty or property and the view that only
Congress, a body that is more representative of the population, and not the
courts, whose judges are nominated by the President and confirmed by the
Senate, should have the power to dictate the criminal law. 74
c.

Liberal Constructionof Remedial Statutes

A statutory cannon that applies to employment and labor law is the rule
that remedial statutes should be liberally construed. As we shall see below,
this canon has been used in interpreting Title VII and other employment
69

Id. at 704-07.

James Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral
Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1 (2005).
70

71

Id. at 5-6.

72

See ESKRIDGE, supranote 63, at 708.

73

See Gamonal & Rosado, supra note 8, at 32.

74

ESKRIDGE, supra note 63, at 651-54.
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discrimination statutes, but it has also been avoided or disregarded, especially
more recently.
d.

Construction of Ambiguous Contracts

Contract law incorporates a principle that when in doubt, "iflanguage
supplied by one party is reasonably susceptible to two different
interpretations, one of which favors each party, the one that is less favorable
to the party that supplied the language is preferred." 7 5 In other words, when
all other interpretive methods have been exhausted and ambiguity of terms
of the agreement remains, the interpreter of a contract should construe the
meaning of the terms against the drafter of the agreement. This rule creates a
rebuttable presumption, contra proferentem in Latin,76 and is used most
frequently when there is an inequality in bargaining power between the
parties and/or the language is drafted by an attorney.77
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts states: "In choosing among the
reasonable meanings of a promise or agreement or a term thereof, that
meaning is generally preferred which operates against the party who supplies
the words or from whom a writing otherwise proceeds."
The rationale for
this rule is that the parties drafting a contract will more likely protect their

own interests over those of the other parties. Morcover, a party drafting a
contract may leave a provision intentionally vague in order to select its own
interpretation later. 9 While the rule is applicable in all situations that fit this
description, in reality, it is used more frequently to protect the party with less
bargaining power and when a more powerful party attempts to enforce form
contracts on a less powerful party. 0
This general rule used to interpret U.S. contracts resembles the Latin
American in dubio pro operario preference which, when applied to the
interpretation of an employment contract, generally means that terms in the
agreement that are favorable to the worker will be given weight if there is
doubt about the meaning of the agreement. Ironically, however, in the U.S.,
courts have long accepted the employment-at-will doctrine, which literally in
the employment context does the opposite. This doctrine creates a strong
presumption that the employment relationship between the employer and
employee is at will, which, as noted above, means that the employer is free
75

E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 459 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds., 4th ed. 2004).

76
77

Id. at 459.

See CACI No.
320 Interpretation https://www.justia.com/trials-litigation/docs/caci/300/320/
78

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

79

Id. at § 206 cmt. a.

80

See id.

§
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(last updated Oct. 2021).
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to fire the employee for a good reason, a bad reason, or even for no reason.
And, perhaps even more ironic, the presumption works against nearly all
employees, even those with equal or greater bargaining power than that of
the employer and those who can afford their own attorneys to negotiate their
contracts. In essence, this turns the concept of interpreting the contract
against the drafter on its head.
e.

Rules of Deference to Administrative Agencies

U.S. law also includes rules concerning the deference due to the
interpretation of statutes by administrative agencies that are empowered by
Congress to enact rules interpreting the statutes and/or to issue guidance
concerning statutory interpretation. Under certain conditions, Congress gives
power in its legislation to executive agencies to interpret the law and to enact
rules and regulations. Other agencies that do not have rulemaking power may
issue guidance. Deference to these agencies in statutory interpretation is
justified by the expertise held in the agency in the subject matter covered by
the statute.
While significantly different from some of the principles discussed by
Gamonal and Rosado because judicial deference to an administrative agency
is linked to the proper roles that Congress, Administrative Agencies of the
Executive branch, and the courts play, considering deference to agency
interpretations is somewhat similar to the Latin American concept of using
principles to decide marginal cases. Moreover, studying how deference to
agencies operates in U.S. courts, especially as I explain below, with reference
to the deference accorded (or not) to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission sheds some light on how U.S. courts interpret and enforce U.S.
statutes. These rules of deference, as we shall see in the next Part, do vary in
the Court's interpretation and enforcement and can lead to results that differ
significantly from the purpose of the legislation.

f

Burdens ofPersuasionand Production

U.S. law at times places burdens of production and/or persuasion and
creates presumptions in an effort to guarantee fairness to less powerful parties
in a number of different settings. 81 In the ordinary civil case, the plaintiff has
the burden to prove her case by a preponderance of the evidence. But
different areas of civil law have shifted the burdens of production or
persuasion to the defendant in order to compensate for the plaintiff's failure
to have evidence to which the defendant has easier access.

81

See infra notes 82-84.
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For example, in Tort law, where there are two negligent defendants only
one of whose actions caused the plaintiff's injury, the burden of proving that
their actions did not cause the plaintiff's injury falls on each defendant.8 2 In
the employment law setting at times the burden of production or persuasion
shifts to the defendant after some initial proof by the plaintiff. For example,
in public employment cases where there is a showing that the constitutionally
protected speech of the defendant was a substantial factor in the adverse
employment decision, the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant to
prove that it would have made the same decision even absent the plaintiff's
protected speech. 83 And, in Title VII employment discrimination cases, there
are a number of shifts of burdens of production and persuasion that are
intended to serve the purpose of equalizing the power of plaintiffs and
defendants and assuring the availability of evidence. 4
While Gamonal and Rosado do not mention this type of procedural
move in Latin America, it is possible that these shifts, if used properly, could
serve the same purpose as some of the principles enunciated by the authors.
Moreover, their presence in our jurisprudence may make judges more
comfortable with the principles enunciated by Gamonal and Rosado.
III. APPLYING LATIN AMERICAN PRINCIPLES TO U.S.
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STATUTES

A.

COVID Vulnerabilitiesand the Employment Discrimination
Statutes

COVID-19 has had a particularly disparate effect on people of color, a
disproportionate number of whom are essential workers. 85 Moreover,
women, particularly women of color, have been forced to leave their jobs at
a disproportionately high rate because of their responsibility for caring for

82
83

Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1948).
Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).

84 See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (introducing shifting
burdens of production to ensure plaintiffs have the opportunity to narrow the inquiry and prove the
employer's alleged reason for the adverse action was pretextual); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424 (1971) (holding that once the plaintiff proves that the neutral employment practice has a disparate
effect on a protected class, the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant to prove the neutral practice is
a business necessity); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), which provide
respectively that liability is established once the plaintiff proves that a protected characteristic is a
motivating factor in the adverse employment action and the defendant may reduce the plaintiff's remedies
by proving that it would have taken the same action for legitimate reasons. For further discussion of this
issue in employment discrimination law, see infra Part III (B)(2).
85

See supra notes 1 and 2.
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children at a time when most children are not in school.8 6 Many persons with
disabilities have underlying conditions that make them more vulnerable to
the virus or to a more serious outcome if they contract the virus.8 7 And, older
individuals have experienced a much higher death rate from COVID-19 than
younger ones. 88 Pregnant women are extremely vulnerable if they catch
COVID-19, but the studies of the vaccines have not included pregnant
women, placing them in a very difficult situation when it comes to making a
decision whether to get the vaccination if required by their employers, who
may or may not be required to accommodate their pregnant employees'
decisions. 89
All of these groups were victims of employment discrimination even
before the pandemic, and, recognizing this vulnerability, Congress enacted
civil rights acts whose purpose is to protect these individuals from
discrimination. But these groups are even more likely to suffer employment
discrimination than they were pre-pandemic. Given this fact, it is clear that
American employment discrimination law that is grounded in many of the
principles identified in Gamonal and Rosado's book and is consistent with
others should consciously be applied with reference to these principles.
This is true because there is no question that civil rights in employment
acts were enacted to protect applicants and employees who are members of
protected classes. For Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act, combined, this means that race, color, sex, religion, sexual orientation,
gender identity, national origin, disability, and age of forty years or older are

86
Heather Long, Virtual Schooling Has Largely ForcedMoms, Not Dads, to Quit Work. It Will
Hurt the Economy for Years, WASH. POST (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/road-torecovery/2020/11/06/women-workforce-jobs-report/ (noting that women's employment lowest since
1988, and more than two million women have left the workforce).
87
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communicating symptoms, and those who have trouble understanding the risk and adopting safe
practices);
COVID-19
Outbreak
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Disabilities, UNITED
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https://www.un.org/development/desa/disabilities/covid-19.htm (last updated Sept. 8, 2021) (many
persons with disabilities have specific underlying conditions that make COVID more dangerous to them).
88
WHO Delivers Advice andSupportforOlder People DuringCOVID-19, WORLD HEALTH ORG.
(Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/feature-stories/detail/who-delivers-advice-and-supportfor-older-people-during-covid19#:~:text=Although%20all%20age%20groups%20are,potential%20underlying%20health%

20conditions (explaining that older people have more severe symptoms than their younger counterparts).
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The Covid-19 Vaccine in Pregnancy and Breastfeeding, TOMMY'S (Dec. 17, 2021),
https://www.tommys.org/pregnancyhub/blogs-stories/covid- 19-vaccine-pregnancy-and-breastfeeding.

FIULaw Review

760

[Vol. 16:741

not legitimate reasons for failures to hire or promote, for discharging,
segregating or engaging in other types of discrimination against individuals
(such as creating a hostile work environment) in their terms or conditions of
employment. Unfortunately, however, U.S. courts have often de-radicalized
these statutes by interpreting them and the underlying factual circumstances
contrary to the principles presented by Gamonal and Rosado, and contrary to
the original purpose of the U.S. laws. 90
B.

The Protective Principle, the Primacy of Reality, and U.S. AntiDiscriminationLaw

1.

The Protective Principle

There is no question that anti-discrimination law's purpose is to protect
employees from discrimination based on their protected traits. For this
reason, when interpreting the anti-discrimination laws, it is fully consistent
with the purpose of the laws to apply the principles identified by Gamonal
and Rosado. And, to some extent, lower courts and the Supreme Court have
considered the goal of protecting workers from discrimination in their
interpretation of the statutes. But while the legislature passed these acts with
an interest in protecting workers from employment discrimination, and the
Supreme Court has, at times generously interpretated the original law,9 1 at
other times, the Supreme Court has restricted the protection of the antidiscrimination laws to the detriment of working men and women. 92
Moreover, even when the Supreme Court has liberally interpreted the law to
protect employees, lower courts have consistently applied the law in nonprotective ways. 93

90

See generally Klare, supra note 39; see infra Part III (B)(2).
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For example, see Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (prohibiting sexual
harassment under Title VII); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998) (prohibiting
harassment by members of the same sex under Title VII); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228
(1989) (concluding that discrimination based on sex stereotyping is illegal under Title VII); Bostock v.
Clayton Cty., Ga., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020) (concluding that the prohibition of sex discrimination under
Title VII also prohibits discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity).
92 For example, the Supreme Court limited the coverage of Title VII in Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) and Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009); it limited the coverage of
the ADA in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999), Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc.,
527 U.S. 516 (1999), Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999) and Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky.,
Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002); it made ADEA and Title VII retaliation claims harder to prove in
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) and Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S.
338 (2013); and it made it difficult for women to bring pay discrimination claims in Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007). In all of these cases, the Supreme Court took a strict
interpretation of the law and ignored the protective purpose of the laws in question.
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See infra Part III (B)(2).
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In a number of situations when the Supreme Court's restrictive
interpretation has limited employees' rights, Congress has reacted in
recognition of the importance of protecting employees by overturning
Supreme Court decisions.9 4 For example, by passing the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act in 1978, Congress overturned the Supreme Court's view
that Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination did not include
discrimination based on pregnancy. 95 Through the 1991 Civil Rights Act,
Congress overturned a number of Supreme Court decisions handed down in
1989 that either limited coverage of a number of acts or made the plaintiff's
proof more difficult. The 1991 Civil Rights Act broadened the coverage of
the disparate impact cause of action, 96 expanded the protection of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, the civil war era statute that protects against race discrimination in
contracting, 97 granted the right to a jury trial and damages under Title VII, 98
and overturned in part the decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, by
permitting liability upon a showing that a protected characteristic is a
"motivating factor" in an adverse employment action. 99 In subsequent
amendments, Congress also overturned Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire
Rubber Co. 100 and a number of key Supreme Court cases decided under the
Americans with Disabilities Act that limited the coverage of the ADA by
defining "disability" narrowly.10 1
But we cannot expect that every time the Supreme Court gets it wrong
Congress will correct the error.1 0 2 Given the political atmosphere and recent
crisis in Congress, reaching bipartisan support for any legislation, much less

94

See infra notes 95-101.

95 See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (concluding that discrimination because of
pregnancy is not sex discrimination); Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C.A. 2000e-(k)
(overturning Gilbert and stating that discrimination based on pregnancy is illegal sex discrimination under
Title VII).
96 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (overturning the 1989 decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642 (1989)).
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§ 2000e-2(m).
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100 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618 (2007) (holding that a woman alleging
pay discrimination must file her charge within 300 days of the announcement of the employer's decision
to set her pay) (overturned by The Ledbetter Act, 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(3)).
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PROBLEMS 26-27 (5th ed. 2010).
102 William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory InterpretationDecisions, 101
YALE L.J. 331, 334 (1991) (presenting empirical data of congressional overrides of Supreme Court cases
that demonstrate that Congress overode the decisions frequently, especially where there was a divided
court that made textualist decisions); Matthew R. Christiansen & William N. Eskridge, Jr., Congressional
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to overturn a Supreme Court conservative interpretation of the civil rights
laws, has become extremely difficult. Assuming a Congressional failure to
act, it is even more important that the courts interpret the law liberally in the
first instance to further the purposes of the laws to protect employee rights.
The possibility of a Congressional check on the Supreme Court's failure to
protect employees is, at least for now, unlikely.
In addition to the erroneous Supreme Court interpretations noted above,
lower courts have adopted a number of substantive legal doctrines regarding
the anti-discrimination laws that have limited the laws' effectiveness and
have also improvidently granted summary judgment and motions to dismiss
in ways that have significantly reduced the protections granted by the laws.
The vast majority of these cases have not been reviewed by the Supreme
Court.10 3
While acknowledging the important advances a number of Supreme
Court interpretations of the civil rights law have made, this Part discusses
interpretations of both the Supreme Court and the lower courts that have done
the opposite-deprived individual employees of a liberal interpretation of the
civil rights laws.
2.

The Primacy of Reality

While the protective principle is the most important Latin American
legal principle applied to employment and labor law, other principles, such
as primacy of reality reinforce the protective principle. According to the
primacy of reality principle, facts matter and language in texts or documents
should not prevail over the facts in the real world. While primacy of reality
is a substantive doctrine, and not one about proof, ordinarily applied in Latin
America to interpret contractual terms between business owners and workers,
and often relates to the question of whether the worker is an employee or an
independent contractor, facts are key in U.S. anti-discrimination law as well.
As in Latin America, U.S. courts refuse to conclude that a textual definition
in an employment contract about the worker's status governs the legal
relationship.10 4 Instead, the court will evaluate whether the individual is truly

103 See infra Part III (B)(2); see also Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Hierarchyand Heterogeneity: How
to Read a Statute in a Lower Court, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 433, 434-42 (2012) (noting that lower courts,
especially state courts, use different interpretive methods from those used by the Supreme Court; the
difference is grounded in the courts' place in the hierarchical structure of appellate review, the resources
available to the court, and whether the judges are appointed or elected).
104

See generally Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 120 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 1997).
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an employee or an independent contractor by looking at the facts of the
relationship.o5
But there is another area of U.S. law where the primacy of reality
doctrine and the "in dubio pro operario"rule (which in this context means
that terms in the agreement that are favorable to the worker will be given
weight if there is doubt about the meaning of the agreement) may aide in
interpreting facts as they relate to legal rights. In the U.S., ordinarily jurors
are the arbiters of facts, and there is a right to a jury trial in civil actions with
legal (rather than equitable) relief. Because most cases brought under the
anti-discrimination laws involve juries, the court must assure that it is not
overstepping its power to deprive the parties of their rights to have juries
adjudicate the facts of the matters before them. Civil procedure protects the
litigants' rights to a jury trial by assuring that the jury, rather than the judge,
retains the power to decide fact questions in the cases that are filed. This
means that when there are genuine issues of material fact in a case, the case
should go to the jury and not be decided by the court. Despite this guarantee,
the courts regularly grant summary judgment to defendants in cases where
there appear to be fact questions that should be decided by juries at trial.
In sum, the protective principle and the rule in dubio pro operario(when
applying the protective principle) mean that courts should interpret civil
rights laws, when their meaning and scope are ambiguous, to further the
purpose of the laws and to favor protection of workers. Moreover, the
primacy of reality principle recognizes the importance of facts on the ground
in judicial decision making in employment law cases. While it is true that in
Latin America the in dubio pro operario concept is a substantive doctrine
and does not apply to methods of proof, U.S. courts use burden shifting and
procedural rules to protect a plaintiff's right to a jury trial. These rules require
judges, when deciding, for example, a defense motion for summary judgment
to interpret the facts in favor of the non-moving party when there is
ambiguity. This rule reinforces the jury trial rights of American litigants. As
we shall see below, other similar concepts to those in Latin America have
governed U.S. anti-discrimination law, but the courts have not been
consistent in their application. This Part discusses the approaches the U.S.
courts have taken and could have taken had they applied the protective and
the primacy of reality principles and the in dubio pro operario rule
consistently to further their analysis in anti-discrimination law cases.

105 See id. at 1012-13 (holding that the contract declaring workers to be independent contractors
did not prevail where facts demonstrated they were employees under the law).
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Liberal Interpretation of Remedial Statutes and Deference to
EEOC Interpretations

Early on after passage of Title VII, the courts considered Title VII and
other anti-discrimination laws to be broad remedial statutes that should be
construed liberally.106 That has changed. More recently, the Court has
refused to liberally construe Title VII law. As to the ADA, the strict
construction of the statute began soon after the law was passed, culminating
in a number of Supreme Court decisions that limited the definition of
"disability." The lower courts followed, concluding that even persons with
cirrohosis of the liver and intellectual disabilities did not have disabilities.1 0 7
Liberal interpretations in these situations would have furthered the protective
purpose of the EEO statutes.
Early Supreme Court cases such as McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co.,108 state that EEOC interpretations are entitled to great

deference. Moreover, the courts deferred early on to EEOC guidelines, even
though they are not promulgated as regulations. As the Court stated in
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, "[t]he EEOC Guidelines are not
administrative regulations promulgated pursuant to formal procedures
established by the Congress. But, as this Court has heretofore noted, they do
constitute '(t)he administrative interpretation of the Act by the enforcing
agency,' and consequently they are 'entitled to great deference." 10 9
Neither of these doctrines continues to be voiced by the Supreme Court
and other federal courts.' 10 So, we have virtually lost the concepts of broad

106 See, e.g., Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 276 (1982) ("Title VII is
a broad remedial measure,
designed
'to
assure
equality
of employment
opportunities,"'
(quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973))) ("The Act was designed to bar
not only overt employment discrimination, 'but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation."' (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971))) ("'Thus, the Court has
repeatedly held that a prima facie Title VII violation may be established by policies or practices that are
neutral on their face and in intent but that nonetheless discriminate in effect against a particular
group."' (quoting Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 349 (1977))).
107 See Furnish v. SVI Sys., Inc., 270 F.3d 445 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that cirrhosis of the liver
did not constitute a disability under the ADA); Littleton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 231 F. App'x. 874 (11th
Cir. 2007) (holding that plaintiff who had an intellectual disability was not a person with a disability under
the ADA).
108

McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273 (1976).

109

Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975); see also Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB
v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (giving deference to EEOC guidelines).
110 See, e.g., Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, n.l (2007) (refusing to
give deference to EEOC Compliance Manual and administrative adjudications); Gen. Dynamics Land
Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004) (refusing to defer to EEOC in an ADEA case "because the
agency is clearly wrong"); Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 442-45 (2013) (refusing to defer to
EEOC guidelines because they were ambiguous and would be confusing to the jury); see also Melissa
Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1937, 1962
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construction and of deference to the EEOC in Title VII cases. Even when
interpreting the ADA in which Congress explicitly granted the power to the
EEOC to write regulations under the Administrative Procedure Act, the
Supreme Court has on a number of occasions, concluded that the regulations
are not reasonable interpretations of the Act or has avoided interpreting the
regulations.
This is the case even though the Court could have resorted to
the clear legislative history to ascertain Congressional purpose. 1 2

4.

Substantive Doctrines and Procedural Moves: Expanding and
Limiting the Protective Principle and Raising Questions about
the Primacy of Reality

A rule that furthers the protective and the primacy of reality principles
in Latin America is in dubio pro operario,I 3 which means that judges should
interpret the law when there is a doubt, in favor of the employee, and in the
case of interpreting documents and facts, that ambiguities should be resolved
in favor of the worker. Early on after Title VII was enacted, the Supreme
Court interpreted the law to create procedural and substantive mechanisms
that would grant some advantages to the employees; while there continue to

(2006) (concluding that the Supreme Court gives little deference to the EEOC because of a particularly
"crabbed" view of anti-discrimination law, resulting in "subtle but significant hobbling of antidiscrimination law"); Burton J. Fishman,EEOC DealtAnother Loss: Is Less Deference the New Normal?,
11 No. 2 FED. EMP. L. INSIDER 3 (2013); Theodore W. Wern, JudicialDeference to EEOC Interpretations
of the Civil Rights Act, the ADA and the ADEA: Is the EEOC a Second-Class Agency?, 60 OHIO ST. L.J.
1533, 1533 (1999) (concluding that the EEOC is a "second-class agency" when it comes to Supreme Court
deference).
111 See, e.g., Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475-80, 482-87 (1999). The Court
refused to defer to regulations and interpretive guidelines that went through the notice and comment
process in determining that the EEOC interpretation was contrary to the plain meaning of the statute. 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j) (2012). Instead, the Court literally extrapolated about the definition of "disability"
(whether to consider mitigating effects of eyeglasses in this case in determining when an individual has a
disability) by looking at the Congressional finding of fact at the time of passage that 43 million individuals
have disabilities. The Court concluded from this finding that Congress did not intend courts to include
within the definition of disability those persons who had mitigating factors that substantially cured the
disability. This was a very roundabout method of statutory interpretation, given that both the legislative
history and the regulations and interpretive guidelines clearly stated that mitigating effects should not be
taken into account in determining whether an individual meets the definition of "disability." See also Hart,
supra note 110, at 1944 (stating that "an extraordinary number of ADA cases turn on [the] threshold
definitional question [of whether a person has a disability], and the EEOC has issued regulations
interpreting and offering detail as to the statutory definition. These regulations have been central to several
of the Court's recent ADA opinions, but in each opinion the Court has 'assume[d], without deciding, that
such regulations are valid' and declared that it had 'no occasion to decide what level of deference, if any,
they are due."').
112

Sutton, 527 U.S. at 499-502 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

113

GAMONAL & ROSADO, supra note 8, at 33.
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be key Supreme Court cases that do the same, others have interpreted the law
to favor employers. Moreover, even where the Supreme Court takes a
favorable view of employees, a large percentage of lower courts do not. As
we shall see, these interpretations deal with law as well as facts and law.
a.

DisparateImpact

In Griggs v. Duke PowerCo. 1 1 4 the Court held that plaintiffs may prevail
in a Title VII disparate impact case if they prove that the employer's neutral
policy has a disparate effect on a protected group and the employer fails to
prove that its policy or practice is necessary to the business and job related.
Although the statutory text was unclear as to whether proving a disparate
effect of a facially neutral policy or practice could sustain a cause of action
under Title VII, the Court, in essence, adopted not only the protective
principle but also in dubio pro operariowhen it interpreted ambiguous terms
of the statute to grant rights to the African American plaintiffs who could not
get an "inside" job at the defendant's plant because they either lacked a high
school degree or performed below the median of those taking an aptitude test.
This was an opinion that applied the protective principle.
Years later, the Supreme Court drastically cut back on its protective
purpose when it decided Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 1 5 whose
employer-friendly description of the burdens contradicted earlier Supreme
Court opinions. This decision was overturned in part by Congress when it
enacted the 1991 Civil Rights Act. Once again, a plaintiff's proof that the
defendant's neutral business practice has a disparate effect on members of a
protected group shifts the burden of persuasion to the defendant to establish
that the policy in question is "job related and consistent with business
necessity."i1 6 Moreover, even assuming that the employer has legitimately
proved that a job requirement is a business necessity, the statute permits the
plaintiff to prevail if it can demonstrate a less discriminatory alternative
exists and that the defendant refused to adopt it.1 17
Unfortunately, even though the 1991 Act was lauded initially for
overturning the pro-defendant Wards Cove v. Atonio, the damage done by
Wards Cove continues to haunt plaintiffs who seek to prove disparate impact
causes of action. In 1991, Congress compromised on the language
overturning Wards Cove, and, as a result, in most cases, the plaintiffs must

114
115
116
117

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii).
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show that a particular employment practice caused the disparate impact.1"'
This requirement, as well as other ambiguous language of the 1991 Act, have
made disparate impact causes of action very difficult to prove and have
permitted judges to use the ambiguity to interpret the law according to their
ideologies.1 19 In fact, an empirical study that examined cases decided before
Wards Cove and those decided after Wards Cove and the 1991 Act produced
startling results. Although overall plaintiffs enjoy a success rate of
approximately twenty percent in disparate impact cases, the vast majority of
the cases won by plaintiffs occurred before Wards Cove was decided.
Before Wards Cove, plaintiffs won 32.7% of cases brought alleging a
disparate impact, whereas after Wards Cove and passage of the 1991 Act,
plaintiffs won only 6.7% of their disparate impact cases. 12 0 This example
demonstrates the difficulty in assuming that Congress can always
successfully overturn a bad Supreme Court decision. Moreover, after the
1991 Act, there is a significant variation between cases decided by appellate
panels dominated by judges appointed by democratic presidents versus those
panels dominated by judges appointed by republican presidents. Whereas
twenty percent of cases decided by democratic appointees won post-1991,
not one of the cases coming before a panel dominated by republican
appointees won.121 The author of the study concluded that the ambiguity of
the language of the 1991 Act allows judges to interpret the law in accordance
with their ideologies.1 2 2
In essence, in interpreting Title VII, at times the Supreme Court, and
even more frequently the lower federal courts, have ignored the protective
principle that underlies the original purpose of the statute; instead of applying
in dubio pro operario,the federal courts have interpreted the law by giving
significant deference to employers to operate their businesses as they see fit.
And, the lower courts have used procedural mechanisms to reinforce these
questionable substantive decisions, denying employees the substantive rights
protected by the civil rights statutes. In effect, the concept of employment at
will, which is the base of our entire labor law system, seems to affect the
lower court judges' interpretations.

118 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i). There is an exception to this rule if the plaintiff proves that
the elements of the employer's decisionmaking process are incapable of separation. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-

2(k)(1)(B3)(i).
119 Michael J. Songer, Decline of Title VII DisparateImpact: The Role of the 1991 Civil Rights
Act and the Ideologies of FederalJudges, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 247, 259, 264 (2005).

120

Id. at 256-57.

121

Id. at 259.

122

Id. at 259, 264.
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McDonnell Douglas Construct

Although the Supreme Court refused to apply Griggs to an individual
case where the job applicant had broken the law to oppose the employer's
practices, the Court refused to approve dismissal of the case based on the
former employee's illegal act and instead created the McDonnell Douglas
construct, which made it slightly easier for an employee to resist motions to
dismiss, for summary judgment, or for a directed verdict. McDonnell
Douglas created an inference of discrimination based on a showing that the
individual was a member of the protected class, was qualified for an open
position, and was not hired or promoted, and the job remained open or was
given to a person who was not a member of the protected class.
While this proof construct did not shift the burden of persuasion to the
defendant, it did shift the burden of production, requiring the employer to
produce evidence of a reason for refusing to rehire the employee. This
articulated "legitimate non-discriminatory reason" for the adverse
employment action notifies the employee of the employer's defense. That
defense narrows the possible reasons that the employee has to rebut in order
to prove that the employer unlawfully discriminated against him. Once the
employer articulates its "legitimate non-discriminatory reason," the
employee then has the burden to prove that the employer's articulated reason
is a pretext for illegal discrimination. Upon demonstrating that the
employer's reason is a pretext for discrimination, the employee may then
prevail. That is, the employee has now created in the very least, a question of
fact for the factfinder. And, generally, with this proof, summary judgment for
the defendant should not be available. 123
The McDonnell Douglas methodology when first developed by the
Supreme Court had the effect of furthering the protective principle by using
the in dubio pro operario1 2 4 rule as a guide to protect employees who alleged
employment discrimination. And, more recently, in an ADEA case, Reeves
v. Sanderson PlumbingProducts, Inc.,125 the Supreme Court reversed a Fifth
Circuit judgment as a matter of law that overturned a jury verdict in the
plaintiff's favor. The Supreme Court decision clarifies that the jury should
consider all the evidence to determine whether the defendant discriminated
against the plaintiff and that proof that the defendant's avowed reason for the
adverse employment decision is pretextual is usually sufficient for a jury

123

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (ADEA case whose holding

also applies to Title VII and ADA cases).
124

GAMONAL & ROSADO, supra note 8, at 33.

125

Reeves, 530 U.S. at 154.
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reasonably to conclude that the defendant discriminated against the
plaintiff. 12 6
Even so, the McDonnell Douglas construct, as interpreted in Reeves, has

been undermined by the lower courts' more recent interpretations. Many
courts have approached this proof mechanism in a formalistic way that makes
it more difficult for plaintiffs to prevail; lower courts have used the construct
or a plaintiffs failure to prove a case using the construct as an excuse to
dismiss the case. This questionable methodology, when combined with a
number of ancillary doctrines that create inferences in favor of the defendant,
is, as noted by Professor Sandra Sperino, inconsistent with deciding cases on
motions for summary judgment, a procedure that requires judges to draw all
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party-the plaintiff in most
cases.1 2 7 While the McDonnell Douglas construct was originally generally
protective of individual employees alleging illegal discrimination, scholars
have recently demonstrated that the construct is being misused by lower
courts, resulting in the denial of protection to the plaintiffs. 128
c.

Same Actor Inference

The same actor inference has not reached the Supreme Court, but a
number of lower courts have held that if the individual who hired the plaintiff
in a civil rights action is the same person who discharged or failed to promote
the individual, an inference arises that illegal discrimination did not cause the
adverse employment action. 129 This inference, which is accepted by a number
of the courts of appeals and whose effect differs depending on the court,
appears to contradict social science research on human behavior.1 30
Moreover, in some courts, the inference makes it more likely that a
defendant's motion for summary judgment will be granted, a totally
anomalous result at this procedural stage.13 1

126

Id. at 146-49.

127

SANDRA SPERINO, MCDONNELL DOUGLAS: THE MOST IMPORTANT CASE IN EMPLOYMENT

DISCRIMINATION LAW 227 (2018).

128

See id. at 317-27.

129

For an excellent description of the same actor defense, the different courts' holdings
concerning the defense and the social science demonstrating that the same actor inference is "deeply
flawed," see CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION 87-89 (9th ed. 2017).
130

131

Id. at 88.

Id.; see also Natasha T. Martin, Pretextin Peril,75 MO. L. REV. 313, 357 (2010) (arguing that
"despite the superficial plausibility of the doctrine's underlying assumption . . . the same-actor doctrine
... allows the judge to usurp the role of the jury, contravenes substantive and procedural law, and damages
notions of acceptability and inclusion in the American workplace."). See also SPERINO, supra note 127,
at 225-26.

"
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This inference, which is not supported by the research according to
social scientists, fails to honor the protective principle and achieves the
opposite of using the in dubio pro operario rule, which would resolve
ambiguous legal and factual issues in favor of the employee. In essence, the
same actor inference is a legal doctrine that resolves ambiguous factual issues
against the employee and in favor of the employer, often without allowing
the case to go to the jury.
d.

"Piecemeal"Approaches: "Slicingand Dicing,

"Stray Comments," and "DisbeliefDoctrines"
A number of scholars have explained that the federal courts have
invented legal doctrines and have responded to motions for summary
judgment by favoring employers and depriving employees of their jury trial
rights. Using a "piecemeal" approach rather than looking at the evidence as
a whole, the courts "slice and dice" the evidence and exclude evidence that
they characterize as "stray comments" from their consideration of the
evidence. 13 2 They also have created doctrines that Professor Sandra Sperino
calls "disbelief doctrines" that favor the employer's side of the tale and draw
inferences in favor of the employer." 133 This approach, which has remained
remarkably consistent for the past twenty-five years, has meant that courts
have improvidently granted summary judgment to defendants in numerous
cases, tightening the noose around the plaintiff to produce only the most
probative and direct evidence instead of accepting all evidence, considering
it as a whole, piece by piece, mosaic by mosaic, to gain a complete

132 See e.g., Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the TorturedTrilogy: The Improper Use of
Summary Judgment in Title VII andADEA Cases, 34. B.C. L. REV. 203, 233-36 (1993) (explaining that
the courts use a "piecemeal" approach, which results in depriving circumstantial evidence of its power
when viewed in combination); Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing of Individual DisparateTreatment
Law, 61 LA. L. REV. 577, 592-601 (2001) (explaining that the Supreme Court in Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000), demonstrated that all circumstantial evidence should be
treated as a whole, but that lower courts subsequently improperly continued to "slice and dice" the
evidence, eliminating some of the circumstantial evidence, and thus depriving cases of their evidentiary
power after Reeves); Kerri Lynn Stone, Taking in Strays: A Critique of the Stray Comment Doctrine in
Employment DiscriminationLaw, 77 Mo. L. REV. 149, 150-51 (2012) (arguing that the doctrine was taken
from a remark by Justice O'Connor, but it was misshapen and distorted by the lower courts to exclude as
evidence what they called "stray remarks" even though Justice O'Connor may not have intended to attack
the probative value or admissibility into evidence of stray remarks).
133 Sandra F. Sperino, DisbeliefDoctrines,39 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 231, 231-34 (2018)
(explaining that disbelief doctrines, which include "stray comments," protection of employers who take
an adverse employment action because of an honest but mistaken belief, the "same actor" defense, among
others, operate to encourage summary judgment against plaintiffs and allow the courts to believe the
employers over employees even though doing so violates the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; also
arguing that these disbelief doctrines have no basis in the statutory text and that judges do not have the
power to decide cases using these doctrines).
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understanding of whether there is sufficient evidence to survive the
defendant's motion and to present the evidence to the jury. These doctrines
and methodologies clearly favor employers, often deny plaintiffs their jury
trial rights, and definitely do not operate to protect employees.
Summary judgment law in theory requires that all reasonable inferences
be drawn in favor of the non-moving party and that the motion be denied
unless there is insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that the
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff because of her
membership in the protected class. 13 4 While this is the law, the lower courts
have created substantive and procedural doctrines out of whole cloth in an
effort to dismiss the cases. In fact, the situation is so problematic that a Sixth
Circuit judge has published a law review article encouraging only one simple
change in the approach to employment discrimination cases: the drawing of
all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff, the non-moving party, in
deciding a defense motion for summary judgment. 135 This is a shocking
development given that Judge Donald finds it necessary to advocate merely
that judges follow the law.
Another good example of how the lower courts use procedure in a way
that is not only inconsistent with the rules of procedure but also restrictive of
employees' substantive rights occurs in cases alleging hostile work
environments based on sex. One requirement in proving that an illegal hostile
work environment occurred is that the behavior be severe or pervasive. 13 6
Lower courts regularly grant summary judgment in cases where a jury could
find the behavior not only unacceptable at work but also sufficiently severe
or pervasive to alter the terms or conditions of the plaintiff's work. 13 7 Neither
highly sexualized comments by a supervisor nor forcibly trapping a coworker and touching her stomach and her breast under her bra were sufficient
to create a jury question about severity or pervasiveness. 138 Recently, a group
of female academics criticized the courts' approach to the severity or
134

Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150-52 (2000).

135

See Bernice B. Donald & J. Eric Pardue, Bringing Back Reasonable Inferences: A Short,
Simple Suggestionfor Addressing Some Problems at the Intersection of Employment Discriminationand

Summary Judgment, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 749, 763 (20 12-2013).
136

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).

137

See, e.g., Chesier v. On Q Finan. Inc., 382 F. Supp. 3d 918 (D. Az. 2019) (granting summary
judgment to defendant because one night of supervisor's sending highly sexualized instant messages to
his subordinate over a three-hour period including comments about her body parts and what he wanted to
do with her was insufficient as a matter of law to be severe or pervasive); Brooks v. City of San Mateo,
229 F.3d 917, 921 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a male employee's behavior was not sufficiently severe
or pervasive to create a hostile work environment based on her sex where he "placed his hand on her
stomach and commented on its softness and sexiness." After she forcefully pushed him away, he boxed
her "in against the communications console.... He forced his hand underneath her sweater and bra to
fondle her bare breast.").
138

See cases cited supra note 137.

FIULaw Review

772

[Vol. 16:741

pervasiveness requirement, arguing that courts should take into account
changing attitudes toward sexually harassing behaviors when deciding
whether a jury question exists. 139
A second issue that may be even more egregious is the courts' treatment
of employer liability in harassment cases. The Supreme Court in Faragherv.
City of Boca Raton, 140 and its companion case, Burlington Industries, Inc. v.

Ellerth,141 held that employers are subject to vicarious liability to an
employee for an actionable hostile work environment created by a supervisor.
If there is no tangible employment action, the Court held, an employer has an
affirmative defense if it proves: (a) that the employer "exercised reasonable
care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and (b)
that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any
preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid
harm otherwise." 14 2
Even though the defendant has the burden of proof on the issue of
whether the plaintiff acted unreasonably-which in most cases should create
a jury question-by granting summary judgment to employers on the
affirmative defense, courts frequently sub silentio eliminate the
"reasonableness" requirement and refuse to send the issue to the jury. 143 In
essence, given the procedural posture of the cases, it should be a heavy lift
for employers to make this proof, but in many situations in which women fail
to report the harassment, the courts conclude as a matter of law that the
employers carried their burden of proving the unreasonableness of the
women's failure to report.
Many courts conclude as a matter of law that plaintiffs who testify that
they were afraid of reporting the events for fear of retaliation did not act
reasonably when they failed to report. 144 This is true despite social science

139

Joan C. Williams et al., What's Reasonable Now? Sexual HarassmentLaw After the Norm

Cascade, 2019 MICH. ST. L. REV. 139, 145 (2019).
140 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
141

Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).

142

Id. at 765.

143

See, e.g., Walton v. Johnson & Johnson Servs., Inc., 347 F.3d 1272, 1288-90 (11th Cir. 2003)
(affirming summary judgment and concluding that employee was unreasonable for her failure to report
the harassment for over two months); Helm v. Kansas, 656 F.3d 1277, 1290-91 (10th Cir. 2011) (even
though judicial assistant told the Chief Judge that her judge made inappropriate advances toward her, the
Chief Judge violated the policy by failing to report the harassment, the Court held that the Chief Judge
acted reasonably and the assistant acted unreasonably, and affirmed the grant of the defense motion for
summary judgment).
144 See Joan T.A. Gabel & Nancy R. Mansfield, Sexual Harassment in the Eye of the Beholder:
On the DissolutionofPredictabilityin the Ellerth/FaragherMatrix Createdby Sudersfor CasesInvolving
Employee Perception, 12 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 81,98-99, 102 (2005) (describing cases where the
courts concluded that a plaintiffs fear of retaliation and subsequent failure to report were unreasonable
even though retaliation for reporting is common).
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evidence that demonstrates that between sixty-five percent and seventy-five
percent of women who report and/or file a charge with the EEOC suffer
retaliation. 145 It is contrary to both procedural law and civil rights law to not
afford these plaintiffs their rights to a jury trial on this issue. Based on these
statistics of how common retaliation is, in most cases it is not unreasonable
for a plaintiff to fail to report the harassment. Moreover, in this situation the
employer has the burden of persuasion and is the movant on a motion for
summary judgment. If the courts applied the law correctly, it would be
extremely rare for an employer to prevail on this issue on summary judgment.
The facts should matter. Instead, the courts hold, in formalistic fashion, that
there was a policy and the plaintiff signed a sheet saying she knew about it,
so therefore it was unreasonable not to report. 146
C. Non-waiver Principle

The non-waiver principle of labor rights under the anti-discrimination
law in the U.S. is well-established when it comes to substantive rights. That
is, an individual cannot agree to a contract with the employer (or prospective
employer) that the worker will not bring a claim for discrimination.
Unfortunately, as Professors Gamonal and Rosado explain, the non-waiver
principle is not at all ensconced in U.S. federal law when it comes to
procedural rights. That is, an employer may not require a prospective
employee to waive rights to not be discriminated against based on race,
gender, disability, etc. because these are considered substantive rights, but
the Court has held that a pre-dispute arbitration clause is enforceable because
it is merely a waiver of procedural rights to a trial.
The research shows, however, that the waiver of the procedural rights to
a jury trial can seriously undermine substantive rights. 14 7 In most commercial
145 See Carly McCann & Donald T. Tomaskovic-Dewey, Nearly All Sexual Harassment at Work
Goes Unreported- and Those Who Do Report Often See Zero Benefit, THE CONVERSATION (Dec. 14,
2018, 6:45 AM), https://theconversation.com/nearly-all-sexual-harassment-at-work-goes-unreportedand-those-who-do-report-often-see-zero-benefit-108378; Tara Golshan, Study Finds 75 Percent of
Workplace Harassment Victims ExperiencedRetaliation When They Spoke Up, VOX (Oct. 15, 2017, 9:00
AM), https://www.vox.com/identities/2017/10/15/16438750/weinstein-sexual-harassment-facts; see also
Agata Boxe, Women Still Face Retaliationfor Reporting Sexual Harassmentat Work, SCI. AM. (Aug. 1,
2019),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/women-still-face-retaliation-for-reporting-sexualharassment-at-work/.

146 To be fair to the lower federal courts, the U.S. Supreme Court in Ellerth appeared to
countenance the grant of summary judgment in these cases based on the employers' affirmative defense.
See Burlington Indus., 524 U.S. at 765 (stating "[W]hile proof that an employee failed to fulfill the
corresponding obligation of reasonable care to avoid harm is not limited to showing any unreasonable
failure to use any complaint procedure provided by the employer, a demonstration of such failure will
normally suffice to satisfy the employer's burden under the second element of the defense.").
147 For discussions of the problems with mandatory pre-dispute arbitration for employees trying
to vindicate their civil rights, see Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Arbitration Stymies Progress Towards
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arbitrations dealing with the alleged violation of an employee's civil rights,
employees have limited rights to discovery (even though the employer has
open access to its own documentation), have no right to a jury of their peers,
have no right to bring a class action, and will have no right to appeal the
arbitrators' decision, even in cases when the arbitrators get the law wrong. 14 1
Although the waived rights may be procedural, their waiver (often
unknowing) will be as damaging to the plaintiff as would be a waiver of
substantive rights. One distinction that is important to make with reference
to arbitration of an employee's civil rights claim is whether the rights' waiver
takes place before the dispute occurs (pre-dispute) or after the dispute occurs
(post-dispute). Most lawyers who oppose pre-dispute arbitration clauses in
employment contracts do so because the waiver is not knowing or voluntary
in most cases. In the case of post-dispute arbitration, in contrast, an employee,
after a dispute with the employer arises, can see a lawyer for advice
concerning whether to sign a waiver of his rights to a jury trial. This waiver,
then, is knowing and voluntary.
There is nothing inherently unequal about arbitration if an employee
decides, after the dispute arises, and upon advice of counsel, to agree to
arbitrate the dispute with the employer. In that situation, presumably, counsel
for both sides can negotiate the terms of the agreement and the process to be
used to select arbitrators. But mandatory, pre-dispute arbitration requires
employees and applicants as a condition of employment to waive their
procedural rights even before any dispute arises and often without knowing
that they are doing so.
Unfortunately, the U.S. Supreme Court has allowed employers to
require employees to condition employment on a waiver of their procedural
rights before a dispute with an employer arises based on a dubious
interpretation of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 14 9 whose purpose is to
encourage arbitration of commercial disputes, not arbitration of civil rights
actions. In fact, as many scholars have pointed out, Section 1 of the FAA
appears to exclude employment disputes from the coverage of the Act. 150
Justice in Employment Law: Where to, #MeToo?, 54 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 155, 170-83 (2019); Jean
R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1648-53 (2005)
(detailing the problems of mandatory arbitration).
148 Michael S. Oberman, 'The Other Shoe': Are Agreements Narrowing Judicial Review
Enforceable?,31 ALTS. TO HIGH COST LITIG. 65 (2013); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Asymmetric Dynamism and
Acceptable JudicialReview ofArbitration Awards, 5 Y.B. ON ARB. & MEDIATION 1, 6 (2013) (explaining
that the statute severely limits judicial review in arbitration to extreme situations such as bias and
corruption of the arbitrator); see 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006) (governing vacating of arbitration awards); 9
U.S.C. § 11 (2006) (governing confirmation of arbitration awards).
149 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14.
150 See,
e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the Employment Contract Exclusion
in Section 1 of the FederalArbitrationAct: Correctingthe Judiciary'sFailure of Statutory Vision, 1991
J. DIsP. RESOL. 259. 263-79.

2022]

Looking South

775

Moreover, when state legislatures passed employee-friendly rules to regulate
arbitrations, in a number of circumstances, the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down those laws as violative of the FAA.1 5 1
The Supreme Court's interpretation of the FAA, which due to the
Supremacy Clause, also severely limits states from banning or limiting predispute mandatory employment arbitration clauses, not only violates the nonwaiver principle but also violates the protective principle. As is commonly
understood, mandatory commercial arbitration of employment disputes
heavily favors employers and operates to limit both procedural and
substantive civil rights of employees. Once again, the Supreme Court has
interpreted the law in a way that operates directly in opposition to the in dubio
pro operario rule. In essence, the U.S. Supreme Court has repeatedly
interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act in a manner that benefits employers
over employees and has resolved ambiguous language in the statute to favor
employers.
D. Continuity Principle

Professors Gamonal and Rosado explain clearly how the U.S. stands
alone with its employment-at-will doctrine, which clearly violates the
principle of continuity. Their position is that the employment-at-will doctrine
is not even a labor law and should be jettisoned. Anti-discrimination laws in
the U.S. are a limited exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. If the
plaintiff can prove that the employer fired, demoted, or otherwise
discriminated against the employee because of the employee's membership
in a protected class, the plaintiff will prevail. Unfortunately, because of the
strength of the employment-at-will doctrine, courts deciding employment
discrimination claims frequently limit the rights protected by the antidiscrimination claims by requiring a showing that the employer consciously
intended to discriminate based on the individual's age, race, gender,
disability, etc.
The intent requirement seriously limits plaintiffs' cases given that
employers have gotten very savvy about not making any comments about
their racial, misogynist, etc. views. In most individual cases, even if the effect
is discriminatory, that is not sufficient. The actor making the decision must
have intended to discriminate based on the illegal reason.1 5 2 Moreover, courts

151 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341-42 (2011) (holding
California's unconscionability exception to enforceability of arbitration clause is preempted by the Federal
Arbitration Act).
152 See Ann C. McGinley, ZViva la Evolucian!: Recognizing Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9
CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 415, 416-17 (2000) (arguing that the Court's definition of intent varies from
the social science's view of the way our minds work).
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often distinguish between illegal harassment and discrimination and bullying
or incivility, claiming that the federal courts should not act as "super
personnel departments." 1 53
But it is important to remember that on the more positive side, the antidiscrimination laws have placed pressure on employers to assure that they
are not perceived to be acting in an illegal way. That is, at least large
employers and many small ones (employers of 15 or more employees are
covered) tend to devote substantial human resources to policies and
procedures to assure that they do not discriminate. And, often before deciding
to fire an employee, large corporations discuss with their lawyers whether
doing so would be permissible. American businesses are very concerned
about the possibility of lawsuits and of losing suits and often act cautiously
in their employment relations in order to avoid a suit.
Even though few Title VII cases are successful in the U.S. courts, 54
employers seem to be influenced by the small potential of a very large jury
verdict against the employer, combined with the reputational damage the
employer faces if such a jury verdict occurs. This may be different from what
happens in Latin American countries where the possible damages are quite
low relatively. Nonetheless, employers in U.S. anti-discrimination suits
frequently win the cases, often because of the courts' deference to
employers-both in interpreting the substantive law and in making
procedural decisions.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

In Professors Gamonal and Rosado's recommendation to create the
continuity principle in the US, they sagely recognize that federal law will
likely not be the best location to encourage the abolition of the employmentat-will doctrine. Unless that doctrine is destroyed as the basis for all of U.S.
labor law, chances are good that none of the other principles will be strong
enough to change the application of U.S. law. They recommend that the states
(like Montana, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands have already done)
abolish the employment-at-will doctrine by statute and adopt the continuity
principle that is recognized in Latin America.
153 See Ann C. McGinley, Creating Masculine Identities: Bullying andHarassment "Becauseof
Sex," 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1151 (2008) (arguing that much behavior categorized as "bullying" and
"incivility" occurs because of sex and if severe or pervasive and unwelcome, it constitutes illegal sexbased harassment under U.S. law); see SPERINO, supra note 127.
154 See Ann C. McGinley, Cognitive Illiberalism, Summary Judgment, and Title VII: An
Examination of Ricci v. DeStefano, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 865, 866-68 (2012-2013) (explaining that
empirical studies demonstrate that plaintiffs in anti-discrimination suits are at a disadvantage in both the
federal district courts and the federal courts of appeals when compared to defendants and when compared
to plaintiffs in other types of cases).
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In Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent
NationalDischargePolicy,155 I made a similar argument, but I directed it at
federal law. I argued that a federal statute should be enacted that would
abrogate the employment-at-will doctrine throughout the country. That was
in different times. Now, it would be nearly impossible to enact such a federal
statute, and even if it were enacted, the Act would likely be deradicalized by
the federal courts. Former President Trump's effort to stack the federal courts
with conservative appointees who will decide cases based on pro-business
principles has likely prejudiced the federal district, appellate, and Supreme
Courts for the next generation of labor cases. Even if very progressive federal
legislation is passed, it is extremely likely that these courts will deradicalize
the legislation through conservative, pro-business interpretations. It is
because of this situation that it is crucial that we work with progressive state
legislatures to promulgate state laws that grant rights to workers that go
beyond those in federal law.
I agree with Professors Gamonal and Rosado that if state legislatures
were to abolish the employment-at-will doctrine and adopt a just cause
requirement for discharging employees, that would likely improve the lot of
workers. But I would like to see some empirical proof comparing how our
anti-discrimination model works indirectly to assure just cause decisions
(although they are not required) with the European and Latin American
model. I would also like to see an analysis (including empirical studies) of
how Montana's, Puerto Rico's, and the Virgin Islands' abolition of the
employment-at-will doctrine has changed behaviors on the ground, if it has
done so.
My sense is that these jurisdictions may not interpret their law as
favorably to employees as do the Latin American countries, perhaps because
of the pro-business ethic in the rest of the country. For one, I suspect that they
have not interpreted successor liability and responsibility in the same way as
the Latin American courts have done. I also wonder whether the abolition of
the employment-at-will doctrine in those jurisdictions has given way to
courts to rewrite contracts to be more favorable to employees as the Latin
American courts have done.
Moreover, I wonder whether employers in Montana act differently than
those in other states where the employment-at-will doctrine continues to be
the law. Most large employers seem to believe that they have to prove a just
cause (if not as a legal matter, as a practical one). Would the abolition of the
employment-at-will doctrine across the states make a difference? I would

155

See Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights andEmployment at Will: Toward a Coherent

NationalDischargePolicy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443 (1996).
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also like to see whether it affects the hiring practices of employers in these
jurisdictions. Empirical work in this area would be fascinating.
But when it comes to anti-discrimination law, which is in essence an
exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, what can be done to give it its
full power-to interpret it in light of its guiding principles? I would suggest
that generally we do not want to bring employment discrimination claims in
federal court. The federal courts have been hostile to these claims over the
past 30 years or so, and the addition of Trump judges with lifetime
appointments will only make the interpretation of the laws worse. For this
reason, I believe we should focus on enacting laws in the states that have
progressive legislatures, governors, and state court judges.
The goal would be that lawyers representing anti-discrimination
plaintiffs would bring their claims exclusively in state court and would avoid
bringing federal claims that would subject their cases to removal to federal
court. This means that there must be robust state anti-discrimination laws as
well as procedures that permit clients to get fairly quick justice and to get a
fair hearing. If there is a state human rights or equal employment opportunity
agency, employees should have a right to remove their claims fairly quickly
from the jurisdiction of the agency and to bring their suits in state court for
adequate compensation.
Examples from my home state of Nevada may be illustrative. Nevada
has been a red, 15 6 then purple,157and, just recently, a blue"' state over the past
twenty years. Literally, it is the first state legislature with a majority of female
legislators. And, for the first time in years, there are democratic majorities in
the state assembly and the state senate and a democratic governor. The state
court judges are elected, and therefore responsible to the public. The state,
which is more conservative in rural areas and the northern part of the state,
has voted increasingly for federal officials who are members of the
democratic party. Of the four members of the U.S. house of representatives
from Nevada, three are democrats and one is a republican. Both U.S. senators
are women and democrats. The Nevada Attorney General is a democrat. This

156 A "red state" is a state in the U.S. where the citizens vote republican in presidential elections.
A "blue state" is a state where the citizens vote democratic in presidential elections. See Why Do We Have
"RedStates" and "BlueStates"?, DICTIONARY.COM (Aug. 27, 2020), https://www.dictionary.com/e/redstates-blue-states-democrat-republican/.
157 A "purple state" is a state in the U.S. where Democrats and Republicans have similar amount
of support: a swing state. See Purple State, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/purplestate
(last visited Feb. 7, 2022).
158 See Susan Milligan, The BattlegroundStates: Nevada, U.S. NEWS (Oct. 1, 2020, 4:51 PM),
https://www.usnews.com/news/elections/articles/the-2020-swing-states-nevada-who-votes-past-resultsand-why-it-matters (explaining that Nevada was once a conservative Western Republican state, but has
consistently been moving to the left as it grows in population and noting that the legislative leaders are
mostly democrats with an African American, a Latina, and a White woman in charge).
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is a perfect situation for passing protective labor legislation in the state that
is not pre-empted by federal law. 159 In the anti-discrimination context, there
is no concern with preemption (except when it comes to bans on pre-dispute
arbitration clauses which are preempted, according to the Supreme Court, by
the Federal Arbitration Act). 160
One concern, of course, is that state judges who have had little or no
experience deciding discrimination cases will look to federal cases decided
by federal judges for guidance in how to interpret the substantive provisions
of Title VII and also when to grant motions to dismiss and for summary
judgment. While there is nothing wrong with looking at federal court
opinions for guidance, state court judges should be educated to assure that
they do not do so in an unthinking manner. California, for example, has
enacted progressive, pro-worker legislation, and its courts have taken an
independent eye to that legislation, recognizing that it grants greater rights
than the federal law.
V.

CONCLUSION

Professors Gamonal and Rosado have written a powerful book that
explains the pro-employee principles that Latin American courts apply when
deciding cases before them. They have argued that these principles should
also apply to employment and labor law in the U.S. These principles are
particularly applicable to U.S. anti-discrimination laws because of the clear
underlying purposes of these laws to protect employees. Today, given not
only the history of the rising inequality in the U.S. between workers and the
wealthy, but also the more immediate stark and real differences of how the
pandemic has affected Americans of different races, classes, and ages, it is
more important now than it has ever been to pay attention to vulnerable
workers and to assure that our laws protect them. Returning to the original
purpose of these laws, judges should consider using the principles that our
southern neighbors apply to labor and employment law and should assure

159 See Political Values and Democratic Candidate Support, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 30, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2020/01/30/political-values-and-democratic-candidate-support/
(finding that 80% of democrats and far fewer republicans (between 24% and 34%) see government
regulation as necessary to solve problems and protect the public).
160 Recently, Congress passed the The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual
Harassment Act on a bipartisan basis. See Deirdre Walsh, Congress Approves Bill to End Forced
Arbitration
in
Sexual
Assault
Cases,
NPR
(Feb.
10,
2022,
12:16
PM),
https://www.npr.org/2022/02/10/1079843645/congress-approves-bill-to-end-forced-arbitration-insexual-assault-cases. The Act prohibits mandatory pre-dispute arbitration in sexual assault and sexual
harassment cases. This Act is crucial to the rights of victims of sexual assault and harassment, but in the
future Congress should pass a broader bill that applies to all types of employment discrimination cases.
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that both procedural and substantive rights granted by our laws are carefully
enforced.

